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Thailand and Compliance with  
   the APMBC: Mission Impossible  
     ... Or a Feasible Task?
This article addresses the mine-action challenges Thailand faces in maintaining compliance with the 
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention. Given the uncertainty of mine locations and the Thailand Mine 
Action Centre’s limited capacity, the delegation of Thailand’s mine-action resources can be an issue, 
as hazardous areas can be difficult to determine. The emergence of a new national land-release mine-
action standard, however, means that Thailand’s ability to efficiently identify hazardous areas will allow 
limited resources to be appropriately assigned to areas needing clearance.
by Håvard Bach [ APOPO ]
The Khmer Rouge claimed yet another victim in July 2011, this time in Thailand’s Trat province near the Cambodian border. This recent incident stemmed 
from the legacy of fierce fighting played out between Khmer 
Rouge and Vietnamese forces on both sides of the Thai-
Cambodian border in the 1980s. The war is finished, but ca-
sualties continue.
Fighting between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese 
typically occurred on and around rocky hilltops and densely 
vegetated ridges, leaving grim conditions for survey and clear-
ance. Most of Thailand’s mine-suspected areas are heavily 
overgrown with large sections scarcely populated and rarely 
visited because of the risk of potential landmines and explo-
sive remnants of war. During the war, front lines regularly 
shifted, thus leaving a blurred picture of where mines may be 
located. While evidence of mines in many areas exists, other 
currently suspected areas have no real evidence of mines oth-
er than a general suspicion stemming from past warfare.
A Landmine Impact Survey was undertaken in Thailand 
from 2000 to 2001. More than 2,000 square kilometers (772 
square miles) were enrolled in the TMAC database and mis-
interpreted as a real representation of the mine problem.1 
Subsequent efforts to resurvey these areas have resulted in 
the cancellation of almost 1,500 sq. km. (579 sq. mi.) of land. 
Today 540 sq. km. (208 sq. mi.) of land remains suspect.1 De-
spite the good effort, Thailand cannot meet its APMBC dead-
lines without a radical change of direction and a structured 
approach to resolving the problem.
APOPO, a Belgian nongovernmental organization, partnered with a local Thai organization, 
Peace Road Organisation (later referred to in this article as APOPO-PRO), and developed a 
survey and land-release methodology for Thailand, which is being implemented in full coop-
eration with the Thailand Mine Action Centre, Thailand’s military, Thai Civilian Deminer Asso-
ciation and Norwegian People’s Aid. The process raises interesting questions related to how 
mine-affected states will comply with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpil-
ing, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (also known as 
the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention or APMBC).
The newly endorsed system challenges a common perception of how to resolve a mine prob-
lem for convention compliance. By analyzing how European countries justify compliance with the 
APMBC, Thailand developed an approach that could enable full compliance within a reasonable 
timeframe, and breaches traditional belief that it would take more than 100 years to rid Thailand of 
landmines. Thailand’s solution may be an example of how similar problems could be addressed in 
other countries.
special focus on livelihood sup-
port such as food security and 
the alleviation of poverty.
•	 The KCCP will contribute toward 
Afghanistan’s States Parties’ ob-
ligation to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpil-
ing, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-personnel Mines and their 
Destruction (also known at the 
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Con-
vention or APMBC); it is expect-
ed that by March 2013 all known 
mined areas will be cleared from 
Afghanistan. 
During the project implementation, 
ATC is building demining skills of the 
recruited community members by con-
ducting on-the-job as well as off-the-job 
trainings. The off-the-job trainings in-
clude review of demining techniques, 
lessons learned, mine-risk education 
and first aid at their base camps after 
leaving demining sites. During the first 
12 months, the selected deminers and 
section leaders underwent capacity-
development training, and if the project 
continues through a second year, sec-
tion leaders will be trained to take over 
team-leader positions.
Conclusion
Following completion of the KCCP, 
all known recorded hazards will be re-
moved from the city (except some re-
sidual threat from exposure of any 
subsurface UXO that appears during 
construction work, movement of ERW 
from other areas or identification of new 
hazardous areas), and civilian accident 
rates are expected to substantially de-
cline. Also, a number of people trained 
as deminers during the implementa-
tion of this project will be given op-
portunities to be hired as deminers on 
other projects or to advance to higher 
positions such as section leaders or team 
leaders. As soon as funds are provided 
for Phase 2 of this project, and Phase 2 
is completed, 22 wards in Kabul will be 
announced free from hazards of known 
minefields. The cleared land will be used 
for housing, agriculture, livestock pas-
turing, leisure activities, development 
projects and industrial revitalization, 
and the people who live close to the 
cleared areas will be able to live safely. 
See endnotes page 83
Deminer working in a minefield during KCCP operations.
Photo courtesy of ATC.
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tinuing with the remaining provinces in 2012. Preparations 
began in January 2011 and the survey was fully implemented 
in June 2011. 
Before implementation APOPO and TMAC jointly de-
veloped the conceptual national framework for land release. 
National standards on survey and land release were devel-
oped, followed by a considerable outreach package. The lat-
ter included conducting two land-release workshops with key 
participants from TMAC, the four HMAUs, NPA and The 
Development Initiative. National survey and land release stan-
dards were reviewed and endorsed during the last workshop. 
The New National Standard
The new national mine-action standard for land release was 
made to comply with International Mine Action Standards. It 
emphasizes the need for tight evidence-based Non-technical 
Survey of all mine-suspected areas in Thailand. The outcome 
of the survey will form a baseline for what Thailand needs 
to clear or release by additional survey to comply with the 
APMBC. The standard’s overarching aim is to provide a use-
ful framework for professional conduct of Non-technical and 
Technical Survey, and justification for safe and effective land 
cancellation and release. The Thai national standard explains 
the principles of land release and the conduct of Non-techni-
cal Survey and Technical Survey. It also provides standard-
ized reporting formats for:
•	 Non-technical Survey
•	 Land-release completion (Non-technical Survey,  
Technical Survey and clearance)
•	 Land reclassification
Informative documents in the standard include an exam-
ple of the APOPO-PRO Non-technical Survey scorecard and 
the accompanying Technical Survey ground-coverage card. 
The Non-technical Survey scorecard is a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet where all possible sources and types of informa-
tion are listed and given a generic value or score. The final 
score is the accumulated value for all individual scores, and is 
used to determine a degree of confidence in whether an area 
is mined or mine-free. The confidence level will form the basis 
for how much follow-on Technical Survey is required to de-
clare an area mine-free after Non-technical Survey. 
The ground-coverage card is similar to the Non-techni-
cal Survey scorecard. By assessing the quality of the assets 
at collecting information during Technical Survey, devel-
oping a generic ground-coverage card is possible. If manual 
mine clearance is the best method and has the highest prob-
ability of finding a mine, a f lail is slightly less suitable and 
has a lower probability of indicating whether or not mines 
are present. The same result can be achieved with the f lail 
as manual demining in Technical Survey by increasing the 
size of the area to be searched. The ground-coverage card 
will inform deminers how much more land needs clearance. 
All available assests will be assessed and given a generic val-
ue in the ground-coverage card.
Land Classification
TMAC, by cancelling 75 percent of SHAs from the LIS, has 
previously defined the remaining suspected areas as mine-
fields, labeling them dangerous areas and treating them as 
confirmed- and defined-hazardous areas. However, a lack of 
mine evidence in one area does not imply evidence of mines 
in the remaining areas. In other words, just because some 
SHAs are cancelled does not mean that the remaining sus-
pected areas are contaminated and must be released by 
Technical Survey and/or clearance. 
Article 5 of the APMBC obliges States Parties to “make ev-
ery effort to identify all areas under their jurisdiction or con-
trol in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to 
be emplaced.”1 A Non-technical Survey should be considered 
a minimum of such effort, and it will thus act as a baseline 
for what must be addressed through Technical Survey and 
clearance (and sometimes more Non-technical Survey) “to 
destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines 
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The national mine-action capacity consists of four military 
Humanitarian Mine Action Units deployed along Thailand’s 
borders. Additional capacities include the Technical Survey 
teams of the partnerships between NPA and the Thai Civil-
ian Deminer Association and APOPO and Peace Road Or-
ganisation; both of these partnerships became operational in 
June 2011. A few other local organizations2 exist, but they lie 
dormant due to a lack of funds. Each HMAU clears approxi-
mately 0.6 sq. km. (0.23 sq. mi.) of land on average per year. 
Less than 2.5 sq. km. (0.97 sq. mi.) is cleared annually, and 
a major part of the clearance capacity is occupied with per-
centage sampling of land that was cancelled through a desk 
assessment of old survey information. The policy was to sam-
ple 25 percent of cancelled land. Assuming that 200 sq. km. 
(77 sq. mi.) of land is still cancellable, a 25 percent sampling 
requirement would require clearance of 50 sq. km. (19 sq. mi.) 
and occupy all of Thailand’s clearance capacity for the next 20 
years without clearing any of the confirmed-hazardous areas. 
TMAC is aware of the situation and is making every effort to 
restructure its own mine-action approach.
TMAC coordinates all HMAUs. Given the comparatively 
small size of the national capacity, Thailand’s mine-action ca-
pacity must be used to clear proven, as opposed to perceived, 
minefields. Focusing on proven minefields was not past prac-
tice, and the HMAUs consequently find very few mines, but 
this does not imply that Thailand has few mines. On the con-
trary, APOPO-PRO found more than 140 anti-personnel 
mines, as well as one anti-tank mine and 168 ERW, during the 
first seven weeks of Non-technical and Technical Survey. Thai-
land (and many other countries) believes that areas that can-
not be proven mine-free must be cleared or, as a minimum, 
released by considerable Technical Survey efforts. In Thailand 
this perception caused the use of scarce clearance resources 
in areas with little or no landmine evidence. Few mines were 
found and few minefields were cleared. Despite a fairly suc-
cessful land cancellation process called the Locating Minefield 
Procedure, Thailand has never fully managed to dispose of the 
Landmine Impact Survey legacy. Clearance resources were 
used indiscriminately to clear suspected-hazardous areas as well 
as sample cancelled land. The real lifespans of the minefields are 
prolonged and as a result, accidents can occur. 
APOPO’s Survey Efforts
TMAC asked APOPO to conduct a Non-technical Survey of 
all mine-suspected areas along the Cambodian border starting 
in 2011 with the provinces of Chantaburi and Trat, and con-
APOPO-PRO Non-techical Survey field discussions in Trat 
province. Small inaccuracies in data recording will have a ma-
jor impact on the result. Quality training and regular monitor-
ing of survey teams are key survey components.
Photo courtesy of the author.
A TM-62 M Anti-Vehicle Mine typical of anti-tank mines 
found in Thailand. 
Photo courtesy of Colin King.
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 15
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol15/iss3/15
54         notes from the field | the journal of ERW and mine action | fall 2011 | 15.3 15.3 | fall 2011 | the journal of ERW and mine action | notes from the field         55
is required for APMBC compliance, we call this a proactive 
response. The convention further commits signatories to re-
spond swiftly and remove mines if they are found later. We 
may call this a reactive-response requirement. It requires a 
stand-by capacity that can swiftly remove mines not identified 
during the process of proactive clearance. 
To explain this further, we may look to Europe. Many 
European countries had problems with mines after World 
War II. The proactive response could be defined as survey 
land and clear all known mined areas. In Norway, this re-
sulted in some 750,000 landmines cleared in four years. Oth-
er European countries had similar responses, and millions of 
mines were found and destroyed. Despite most of the mine 
problem being resolved by 1949, a proactive survey and clear-
ance response was maintained well into the 1960s in a few ar-
eas. Beyond 1949, most countries moved from a proactive to 
a reactive response and actively stopped looking for mines in 
favor of reactive stand-by (military) capacities. This process 
is ongoing today. Mines are still found from time to time in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, Spain and the 
United Kingdom.
European countries nevertheless consider that they have 
made every effort to identify mined areas through survey and 
remove all known mines through clearance. A small residual 
risk of mines remains, but revitalizing a proactive response 
is considered unreasonable. One way Europe deals with this 
small but constant residual risk is by restricting land use. Re-
strictions may materialize as special clearance requirements 
on new construction sites or as restrictions on general land 
use. Using fire is prohibited or restricted in some areas. Com-
mon agreement exists on the soundness of this policy, which re-
sults in very few accidents over time. However, this approach 
must not be confused with the situation in the Falkland Islands, 
for example, or the beaches in Skallingen in Denmark. Mines 
in these areas are known to be in specific locations and should 
thus be cleared during the proactive-response phase. 
Assessing Europe’s experience is useful when attempting 
to ensure other nations’ compliance with the APMBC. Such 
an assessment shows that convention compliance is a two-
stage process of proactive and reactive response; it should 
form the basis for understanding how countries may address 
their own problems more effectively while complying with the 
convention. Mines remain in Europe, but the proactive effort 
to remove them has finished and the reactive effort continues. 
Finding the remaining mines through survey is unreason-
able and impossible because they could be anywhere with-
in larger, typically uninhabited areas. Clearing these areas 
would require enormous resources, and we would all agree 
that Europe’s reactive response is not only appropriate, but it 
also complies with the convention. 
APOPO-PRO’s Non-technical Survey in Thailand
Expert group. An expert group consisting of experi-
enced staff from TMAC, HMAU and APOPO-PRO was 
Confirmed-hazardous areas should not be created due to indefinite fear of mines stemming from 
past warfare or from a lack of proof that areas are actually mine-free. Such fear is rather a pointer 
for investigation of real evidence. CHAs should also not be created due to a lack of access to distant 
areas or a lack of information/informants in uninhabited areas. Only real mine evidence coupled 
with a war-tactical assessment justifies the creation of a CHA. 
TMAC’s Area With Restrictions report explains area with restrictions as: “when all reasonable ef-
fort has been made to conduct a Non-technical Survey in an area (typically a SHA) but a lack of ac-
cess to the area or shortage of information/informants has prevented conclusive cancellation of 
land or the creation of CHAs. AWRs are typically scarcely inhabited or uninhabited areas (forest, 
mountain areas, long-term flooded areas/dams etc.) where there is no concrete evidence of mines 
related to any specific part of the wider area. The residual risk of mines is deemed small, which jus-
tifies a shift from a proactive mine-action effort to a reactive mine-action response if mines should 
occur later.”4
When survey organizations fill in the national Area With Restrictions form they are obliged make 
the statement: “We have made all reasonable efforts to survey the area through the conduct of evi-
dence-based Non-technical Survey. The survey was inconclusive because of either a lack of access 
or shortage of information/informants. We found no evidence of mines in specific parts of the area. 
Since the survey was inconclusive, we request the area to be reclassified as Area With Restrictions. 
Type and level of restriction should be determined by TMAC in collaboration with local authorities.”
not later than ten years after joining the treaty.”3 Failing to put 
into effect this Non-technical Survey distorted the scope of the 
mine problem in many countries and prevented an appropri-
ate mine-action response to the problem. In Thailand, it has 
resulted in a lack of focus on the real problem. Few mines were 
cleared, and the lifespan of real mined areas was extended. 
Relabeling all Suspect Land as SHA
IMAS calls for a detailed evidence-based Non-technical 
Survey as the minimum effort to create CHAs; only now is 
this happening in Thailand. TMAC has consequently agreed 
to reclassify all currently suspected areas as SHAs. These 
areas are not a measurement of the scope of the problem 
but rather areas where a Non-technical Survey is needed. 
Thailand considers Non-technical Survey as the first step in 
complying with the APMBC—“to make every effort to iden-
tify all areas known or suspected as mined.”3
Time for Reflection
The principles of drawing CHAs and cancelling land 
through a Non-technical Survey are fairly well understood. 
However, flaws in the system puzzle operators, politicians and 
mine-action authorities. Operationally, these flaws magnify 
the mine problem, committing scarce resources to clear areas 
that are eventually proven mine free and leaving CHAs un-
cleared for decades. If a CHA can only be designated as such 
through evidence of mines being laid, what does this mean for 
areas that cannot be reached during the survey or areas with 
little or no information available about mines? These are typi-
cally large, scarcely inhabited or uninhabited areas that form 
part of a wider combat zone but with no evidence of mines re-
lated to any specific location. Some mines may be in these ar-
eas, but identifying their location is impossible. Should these 
areas be cleared, or does the APMBC deem it acceptable to 
leave mines in the ground for future clearance, enacting gov-
ernment restrictions for future land use? Should the area then 
maintain a classification as SHA or perhaps be cancelled? 
Leaving an area as a SHA implies more survey is required, 
which is not possible in the foreseeable future. Cancelling land 
requires a fair certainty that no mines exist; most specialists 
would hesitate to cancel such land. When survey detail is lack-
ing, these areas are more often enrolled in databases as CHAs 
(other terminology may be used, but the meaning is the same).
While statements like impact-free and mine-safe contra-
dict the APMBC and could be seen as a shortcut to compliance, 
governments and operators in particular are looking for more 
efficient ways to release land and clear real minefields. They un-
derstand that by committing resources wrongly, the lifespan 
of the real, mined areas is prolonged significantly. Risk to local 
populations is proportional to the length of time these mined 
areas remain active. Local people will start to use mined areas if 
they are not cleared. More accidents will thus occur than if real 
mined areas (CHAs) are cleared more swiftly. 
Proactive Versus Reactive Response
Compliance with the APMBC requires a reasonable ef-
fort to identify the scope of the problem and subsequently re-
move all mined areas identified during this process. As this 
Map of Thailand.
Courtesy of CIA Factbook.
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initially established to score the value of individual evidence. 
A scorecard incorporating every useful piece of potential 
Non-technical Survey information was developed with a scor-
ing value for each piece of information.
Affinity between the Non-technical Survey and the Tech-
nical Survey. The Non-technical Survey will define the mini-
mum requirements for follow-on Technical Survey before land 
can be released. When sectors are scored differently within 
the same CHA, this may justify a graded Technical Survey re-
sponse. Most previous surveys failed to quantify affinity be-
tween the Non-technical Survey and Technical Survey for a 
tailored and more efficient Technical Survey response.
Drawing polygons. The survey teams were trained to draw 
tight CHA polygons based on an assessment of evidence cou-
pled with a war-tactical assessment. 
Sector division of CHAs. Following drawing of tight poly-
gons, there may be scope to subdivide the CHA into smaller 
sectors. This is based on various degrees of evidence in dif-
ferent parts of the CHA (regarding the presence or absence 
of mines). Each sector will state whether mines are present or 
not. The amount and quality of evidence from the survey will 
generate a degree of confidence in these statements. 
Mines versus unexploded ordnance. Evidence of explo-
sions or unexploded ordnance is not the same as mine evi-
dence. The survey concept distinguishes consciously between 
mine and UXO evidence. The latter is not covered by the 
APMBC and will be reported separately. 
Technical Survey. A Technical Survey component was es-
tablished for selective deployment into areas where a tactical 
assessment provides multiple options or reasons for placing 
mines during the war. The component does not aim to con-
duct full Technical Survey, where the aim is to define the exact 
boundaries of mined areas or to release land. APOPO-PRO’s 
Technical Survey capacity reinforces the Non-technical Sur-
vey, where needed, to justify tighter CHA polygons. The Non-
technical Survey component (two manual-demining teams) 
is thus considered part of the Non-technical Survey and will 
help determine CHA and/or cancel land. 
Land classification. Following the Non-technical Sur-
vey, land will be classified as a CHA, cancelled area or area 
with restrictions. This last classification will only occur in 
cases where all reasonable effort is made to conduct evi-
dence-based Non-technical Survey, but the survey failed to 
conclude because of a lack of evidence or access to land. A 
precondition for drawing an area with restrictions is that 
there is no evidence of mines in specific parts of a larger 
area. If real mine evidence exists, a CHA will be created 
around it. TMAC will define type and level of restriction 
Figure 1. Diagram illustrating the process of resolving Thailand’s mine problem. The blue line indicates the current status.
Graphic courtesy of the author/CISR.
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on a case-by-case basis in consultation 
with local authorities. An area with re-
strictions will not be created based on 
an assessed low impact. 
Follow-on Technical Survey. A fol-
low-on Technical Survey concept was 
developed in collaboration with TMAC. 
APOPO-PRO’s role is not to conduct full 
Technical Survey at this stage; instead 
the HMAUs were partially trained to 
do it. APOPO-PRO will likely start con-
ducting follow-on Technical Survey and 
clearance in 2012. The Technical Survey 
concept follows the logical framework 
of the Non-technical Survey and com-
plements the decision-making process 
to release land by measuring degrees of 
confidence in areas being mine-free. 
It is too early to predict the final 
outcome of the survey. Preliminary 
results from one month of fieldwork, 
however, indicate that between 10 and 
20 percent of suspect land (now re-
classified as SHA) will be classified as 
CHA from the survey. The situation 
could be different in other places along 
the border, and the final outcome may 
or may not be an improvement. The 
remaining land will be reclassified as 
either cancelled areas or area with re-
strictions. TMAC and APOPO-PRO 
developed appropriate forms for sepa-
rate reporting of CHA, cancelled areas 
and area with restrictions. 
If we assume that the APOPO-PRO 
survey will result in 10 percent of sus-
pect land being classified as CHA, 
Thailand will need to address 54 sq. km. 
(20.8 sq. mi.) of suspected-hazardous 
land proactively to reach its ultimate 
goal as a mine-free state. Thailand will 
further need to maintain an effective 
reactive-response capacity for APMBC 
compliance. If we further assume that 
Technical Survey and/or clearance as-
sets will be needed on 60 percent of this 
ground, assets will be used to cover ap-
proximately 30 sq. km. (11.6 sq. mi.) of 
land. With eight years left of the conven-
tion extension, Thailand’s national and 
international capacity needs to be big 
enough to cover 4 sq. km. (1.5 sq. mi.) 
of land per year. This is almost twice the 
size of the current clearance capacity—
a challenging but indeed tangible task. 
Conclusion
With proper identification, mark-
ing and use of clear terminology, the 
incident in the Khmer Rouge in July 
could have been avoided. In hindsight, 
Thailand’s new land-release approach 
could drastically shorten the lifespan of 
the remaining minefields and boost the 
number of cleared mines. Mines will 
claim fewer victims, and full APMBC 
compliance is not beyond the realm of 
possibility. 
See endnotes page 83
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